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“Accordingly, we reject the claim that the Sixth Amendment guarantees 
a ‘meaningful relationship’ between an accused and his counsel.” 
Chief Justice Burger in Morris v. Slappy (1983)1  
 
 
“[T]he Sixth Amendment counsel of choice . . . commands, not that a 
trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to 
wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best.” 
Justice Scalia in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006)2  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s generosity toward the criminal defendant’s right 
to counsel has waxed and waned.  It waxed in Gideon v. Wainwright3 
and waned in Strickland v. Washington.4  Gideon promised every person, 
black or white, rich or poor, the “guiding hand of counsel at every step 
in the proceedings against him.”5  Strickland’s cramped definition of 
“effective counsel,” however, meant that promise could be fulfilled with 
a lawyer of the most minimal competence.6  
Less discussed is the low point reached in Morris v. Slappy,7 where 
the Court declared that the Sixth Amendment did not include “the right 
to a meaningful attorney-client relationship.”8  That dictum was not 
necessary to decide Slappy, but this spare outlook has dominated the 
Court’s view of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice, a right 
that is nonexistent for indigent defendants and limited for nonindigent 
defendants. 
However, in light of Justice Scalia’s recent and more generous view of 
the right to counsel of choice in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,9 it is 
 1. 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). 
 2. 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2562 (2006). 
 3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 4. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 5. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (setting out the two-part test—performance of 
counsel and prejudice to the defendant); Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and 
Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths—A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 113 
(1986) (“Altogether, the justices signaled an intent to shield at least appellate courts from 
more than minimal involvement with claims of inadequate representation . . . .”).  For 
example, the standard is so low that the Fifth Circuit divided on whether a sleeping 
lawyer could still be “effective.”  See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 
2001) (en banc). 
 7. 461 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 8. Id. at 13. 
 9. 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006). 
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time to revisit the Court’s position in Slappy, an underrated and largely 
ignored case, as well as the limited nature of the right to counsel of 
choice in general.  Gonzalez-Lopez’s narrow holding was that the erroneous 
denial of the right to retained counsel of choice is structural error 
requiring automatic reversal.10  More broadly, Justice Scalia professed that 
the right to counsel of choice is not circumscribed by Strickland’s stingy 
definition of “effective” counsel, as the Court had previously intimated,11 
but has independent footing, implicitly encompassing the right to a 
meaningful attorney-client relationship. 
There is ample support for the notion that “a meaningful attorney-
client relationship” is not only contemplated by the Sixth Amendment, 
but is the point of the right to counsel of choice.12  A client chooses a 
lawyer with whom he or she can develop the bedrock principle of trust.  
Without this trust, the relationship is indeed meaningless, and the client 
will choose another attorney.  When grounded in this reality, the right to 
counsel of choice becomes more robust, for both the indigent and 
nonindigent defendant. 
While the Supreme Court has established that the right to retained 
counsel of choice may be outweighed by countervailing interests, it has 
never given lower courts guidance on how much weight to give the Sixth 
Amendment right in the balancing.13  For nonindigent defendants, this 
translates into giving trial courts broad discretion to deny counsel of 
choice for reasons of administrative efficiency.  Rarely, if ever, will an 
 10. Id. at 2566.  This holding was not necessarily surprising, as most of the circuits 
that had addressed the issue had used an automatic reversal standard.  See Wayne D. 
Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: Do 
Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for the 
Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 181, 186 n.28 (1998) (stating that the nearly uniform rule 
among the courts of appeals which considered the question was that a defendant who has 
been denied the right to counsel of choice need not show prejudice).  See, e.g., Glasser v. 
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (finding that an unreasonable denial of right to 
counsel of choice “may so offend our concept of the basic requirements of a fair hearing 
as to amount to a denial of due process”); Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 281 (6th Cir. 
1985) (“Evidence of unreasonable or arbitrary interference with an accused’s right to 
counsel of choice ordinarily mandates reversal without a showing of prejudice.”). 
 11. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (“[T]he essential aim of 
the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather 
than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he 
prefers.”). 
 12. See infra notes 93–111 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 24–30 and accompanying text. 




appellate court disturb a trial court’s denial of a continuance when weighing 
the court’s calendar against the right to counsel of choice.14
For indigent defendants, since they have no right to counsel of choice, 
a trial court can deny a defendant’s motion to continue the trial in order 
to allow his appointed counsel to stay on the case, thereby severing an 
ongoing attorney relationship.  In that circumstance, according to the Court 
in Slappy, there are no constitutional rights involved.15
This Article takes its lead from the core principles of the right to 
counsel of choice expressed in Gonzalez-Lopez.16  These principles 
indicate that the right should include an indigent defendant’s right to 
continue an attorney-client relationship established at some point in the 
past, and that, for both nonindigent and indigent defendants, the right to 
continue a trial with counsel of choice must be honored by trial courts 
unless it would be unethical or manifestly unjust to do so.  This means 
that trial courts must almost always grant a continuance to accommodate 
that choice and could rarely deny such a request for reasons of administrative 
convenience or docket control. 
Part II gives the reader a history of the development of the Court’s 
jurisprudence in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.  The 
history shows that the right is restricted by one’s ability to pay for that 
counsel, and that the Court has placed limits on even the rich man’s 
choice in certain situations.  Part III positions the indigent defendant in 
Slappy in this history and describes the case in some detail.  The detail is 
necessary to show the Court’s hostility toward Joseph Slappy, whether 
owing to his poverty, his crime, or his nerve in standing up for himself.  
After describing the Court’s rejection of a right to a meaningful 
attorney-client relationship, Part IV demonstrates that such a right, 
adequately defined, is inherent in our adversary system of justice and 
that a defendant’s right to counsel incorporates this right.  Finally, Part V 
looks closely at the Court’s most recent description of the right to 
counsel of choice in Gonzalez-Lopez.  The opinion suggests that Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel jurisprudence needs to be revisited and 
revised to give both the indigent and nonindigent defendant a stronger 
constitutional interest in an ongoing attorney-client relationship. 
II.  THE RIGHT TO RETAINED COUNSEL OF CHOICE 
The origins of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of one’s choosing 
are murky, at best.  Certainly, it is not contained in the words of the 
 14. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 125–30 and accompanying text. 
HOEFFEL 11/16/2007  9:24:49 AM 
[VOL. 44:  525, 2007]  A More Robust Right to Counsel of Choice 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 529 
 
Amendment itself, which guarantee that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel 
for his defence.”17  Historically, the right to counsel developed as a right 
that inured only to the wealthy defendants, as they had the means to 
bring counsel to trial with them, and, of course, they brought counsel of 
their choosing.18  Hence, when the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama 
stated that “[i]t is hardly necessary to say that, the right to counsel being 
conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure 
counsel of his own choice,” this meant no more than that someone who 
could afford a lawyer should be given time to get one.19
However, Powell was not a case about right to counsel of choice.20  
The Court did not have a real opportunity to recognize this right directly 
until 1988, in Wheat v. United States.21  Shortly before his trial, Mark 
Wheat wanted to substitute his own retained counsel with Eugene 
Iredale, a well-known, successful defense attorney, who had already 
orchestrated good results for two of his codefendants.22  All three 
defendants executed waivers of any conflicts of interest in the multiple 
representation by Iredale.23
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 18. See Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an 
Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 41–42 (1991) (explaining that, at the time 
of enactment, the Sixth Amendment only meant the right to retain counsel of choice at 
one’s expense). 
 19. 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). 
 20. In Powell, six African American men—the “Scottsboro boys,” as they were 
called—were accused of the capital offense of raping two white women.  DAN T. 
CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 247–48 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 1971) (1969).  On the day of trial, a member of the bar offered in a very casual 
manner to help in representation of the men.  See Powell, 287 U.S. at 56 (describing the 
appointment of counsel as “little more than an expansive gesture”).  Given the timing, 
the number of defendants, the “hanging” atmosphere, and the seriousness of the offense, 
the issue was one of adequate representation more than counsel of choice.  See Eugene 
L. Shapiro, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice: An Exercise in the 
Weighing of Unarticulated Values, 43 S.C. L. REV. 345, 345–46 (1992) (stating that the 
first strong mention of the right was in Powell, and even that mention was only 
peripheral). 
 21. 486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
 22. See id. at 155 (describing the two favorable results); id. at 170 (noting Iredale’s 
“fantastic job” on behalf of one of the codefendants) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Pamela S. 
Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing Vision of the 
Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670, 687 n.79 (1992) (noting Iredale was recognized as 
a “superstar”). 
 23. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 156. 




A bare majority of the Supreme Court found that while Wheat should 
be given a presumption in favor of counsel of his choice, the presumption 
was overcome by the showing of “a serious potential for conflict.”24  
Justice Rehnquist justified the qualification of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel of choice by noting: 
[W]hile the right to select and be represented by one’s preferred attorney is 
comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is 
to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to 
ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he 
prefers.25
Justice Rehnquist implied that the right to counsel of choice, if denied, 
could never be remedied as long as the defendant received effective 
assistance of counsel at trial.  Hence, the majority did not endorse a very 
robust Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. 
The Wheat Court also gave little weight to the right to counsel of 
choice in the balancing process.  The Court rejected the defendant’s 
claim that the waivers by all three defendants cured the conflict, stating 
that “institutional interests in the rendition of just verdicts in criminal 
cases” may override the defendant’s interests.26  Those interests include 
“ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards 
of the profession,”27 ensuring that “the legal proceedings appear fair to 
all who observe them,”28 and “the legitimate wish of district courts that 
their judgment remain intact on appeal.”29  This broad language has done 
little to guide lower courts on how much weight to give the right to 
counsel of choice in the balance.30
A year later, in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, the 
Court again recognized the defendant’s “right to retain counsel of his 
choosing” and his “‘right to spend his own money to obtain the advice 
 24. Id. at 164.  The alleged conflicts were far from realizable, and it was apparent 
to observers that the government did not want to deal with the potency of Eugene 
Iredale.  In dissent, Justices Stevens and Blackmun contended that the Court held “a 
paternalistic view of the citizen’s right to select his or her own lawyer,” “greatly 
exaggerate[d] the significance of the potential conflict,” and gave “inadequate weight to 
the informed and voluntary character of the clients’ waiver of their right to conflict-free 
representation,” ignoring the fact that independent counsel had advised Wheat concerning the 
wisdom of a waiver.  Id. at 172 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Scholars have written about and 
recognized the falsity of the government’s claims of potential harmful conflicts in 
Wheat.  See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, “Through a Glass, Darkly”: How the Court Sees 
Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1262 (1989). 
 25. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159. 
 26. Id. at 160. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 161. 
 30. See Shapiro, supra note 20, at 350 (making the same point). 
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and assistance . . . of counsel.’”31  Like Wheat, however, Caplin & Drysdale 
upheld a limitation on the right.32  The majority upheld a restriction on 
the defendant’s ability to retain counsel of his choice due to a federal 
asset forfeiture provision that reduced a defendant’s available funds to 
pay a lawyer.33  Justice White, for the bare majority, reasoned that a 
“defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person’s 
money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are the 
only way that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his 
choice.”34
As in Wheat, the Court was sharply divided.  The dissent in Caplin & 
Drysdale articulated the basic underlying values of the right that support 
a more robust right to counsel of choice.  Justice Blackmun argued that 
the right plays a “distinct role . . . in protecting the integrity of the judicial 
process, a role that makes ‘the right to be represented by privately retained 
counsel . . . the primary, preferred component of the basic right,’”35 it 
“foster[s] the trust between attorney and client that is necessary for the 
attorney to be a truly effective advocate,”36 and it assures “some 
modicum of equality between the Government and those it chooses to 
prosecute.”37  These principles, including a formulation of a meaningful 
attorney-client relationship, would logically apply to indigent defendants 
as well, but the Court has yet to make that application.38
Following Wheat and Caplin & Drysdale, lower courts consistently hold 
that the right to a retained lawyer of one’s choosing “can be circumscribed 
by a sufficient overriding interest of the judicial system.”39  Because the 
Court did not give guidance as to how much weight to give the right to 
 31. 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (quoting Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation 
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 370 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 32. Id. at 624–25. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 626.  For a criticism of the Court’s treatment of the right to counsel in 
Caplin & Drysdale, see Garcia, supra note 18, at 87 (“[T]he Caplin Court left no doubt 
about its predilections: it thoroughly concurred with legislative efforts to deprive 
defendants charged with major drug offenses of their ability to hire private attorneys.”); 
id. at 86 (“The Court’s jurisprudence in this sphere is seriously flawed, reflecting its 
strong preference for crime control and efficiency imperatives and its corresponding 
depreciation of the critical role of the defense attorney in the criminal process.”). 
 35. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 645 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 646. 
 38. See discussion infra Part III. 
 39. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.4(c), at 557 (2d ed. 
1999). 




counsel of choice, courts have readily denied counsel of choice when it 
interferes with the trial court’s effective administration of justice in 
controlling its own docket.  Appellate courts give the trial courts wide 
latitude in exercising their discretion to grant or deny the continuances 
requested by defendants to accommodate chosen counsel’s schedules.40  
Such an unchecked ability to sever the ongoing relationship between a 
defendant and his chosen attorney suggests that the right to counsel of 
choice is fairly low on the hierarchy of Sixth Amendment rights.41
In this context, a trial court’s denial of a continuance request by an 
indigent defendant, which effectively severed the defendant’s ongoing 
relationship with his appointed lawyer, and the subsequent affirmance by 
the Supreme Court in Slappy, likely appeared unremarkable at the time. 
III.  SITUATING MORRIS V. SLAPPY 
Just as it has always been assumed since the adoption of the Sixth 
Amendment that a defendant has a right to retained counsel of his 
choice, it has also always been assumed that the indigent defendant has 
no correlative right to counsel of his choosing.42  While the Court 
expanded the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to indigent defendants 
in Gideon v. Wainwright,43 the right to counsel of choice was not also 
extended.44  Once Gideon effectively created an appointed counsel system, 
 40. See Holly, supra note 10, at 191–92 & nn.58–59 (1998) (observing that 
appellate courts give trial courts “wide discretion to . . . grant or deny continuance . . . to 
(i) accommodate a defendant’s chosen counsel’s scheduling conflict or illness, or (ii) to 
provide a defendant with additional time to obtain new counsel,” and citing cases).  See 
also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 11.4(c), at 559 n.44, 560 n.46 (citing cases 
demonstrating that the right to counsel of choice “may not be insisted upon in a manner 
that will obstruct an orderly procedure in courts of justice and deprive such courts of 
their inherent powers to control the same”). 
 41. Judge Posner described the reduced status of the right to counsel of choice as 
follows: 
That a district judge has a broad discretion to extinguish the right to counsel of 
one’s choice for reasons of calendar control suggests that this right, which in 
any event no indigent criminal defendant has, is, like the right to effective 
assistance of counsel (a right whose vindication requires proof of prejudice), 
not so fundamental as the rights protected by the rule of automatic reversal. 
United States v. Santos, 201 F.3d 953, 960 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 42. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 11.4(a), at 550 n.2 (citing cases stating the 
indigent defendant has no right to counsel of choice); Holly, supra note 10, at 197 n.91 
(same). 
 43. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 44. Ironically, in retrospect, on remand from Gideon, the trial court deferred to 
Gideon’s choice of appointed counsel.  Abe Fortas had enlisted a prominent trial lawyer 
to represent him, the prosecution suggested a public defender, and Gideon asked for a 
particular local attorney.  Gideon’s wish was granted.  Brief for the Respondent at 21, 
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006) (No. 05-352), 2006 WL 
838892 (citing ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 237–38 (Vintage Books 1989) 
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appellate courts upheld trial judges’ complete discretion to appoint any 
competent attorney they chose for an indigent defendant, regardless of 
the defendant’s preferences.45
There is a lively debate about whether the justifications traditionally 
given are adequate to deny indigent defendants a Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel of choice.  According to Professor Wayne LaFave, one of the 
justifications is an assumption that judges are better able to choose an 
attorney than the indigent defendant “because they know the abilities of 
the available local counsel.”46  A second justification is a concern that 
allowing defendants to choose will disrupt the “even handed distribution 
of assignments” by imposing a substantial burden on the more experienced 
attorneys and giving an advantage to repeat offenders, who are most 
likely to know and select those attorneys.47  Both of these rationales have 
been roundly criticized as inadequate,48 and scholars have called for a 
system that allows for choice in the initial appointment.49
(1964)) (“That the trial judge deferred to Gideon’s choice shows the continued vitality of 
the original understanding that the assistance of counsel involved a defendant’s choice 
and not simply the presence of some attorney at his trial.”). 
 45. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 11.4(a), at 550.  This is mirrored by the rules 
regarding substitution of counsel: an indigent defendant has no right to replace one 
appointed counsel with another and has a right to substitution only upon establishing 
“good cause, such as conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication, or an 
irreconcilable conflict which [could] lead . . . to an apparently unjust verdict.”  Id.           
§ 11.4(b), at 555.  Mere loss of confidence in one’s attorney is not “good cause,” and the 
defendant cannot insist upon new counsel because he does not like the appointed 
counsel’s “attitude,” association with the prosecutor, or approach on matters of strategy.  
Id. 
 46. Id. §11.4(a), at 550. 
 47. Id. §11.4(a), at 550–51.  Professor LaFave gives a third justification: since the 
Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant a right only to representation that is 
competent, and not to that representation that he believes—correctly or not—to be the 
best, the trial court may value over the defendant’s choice the administrative convenience of 
an appointment system that ignores defendant’s preference.  Id.  Importantly, however, 
the Supreme Court in Gonzalez-Lopez rejects this rationale.  See discussion infra Part V. 
 48. See Holly, supra note 10, at 201–15 (arguing the inadequacy of each of the 
three rationales); Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from 
England and the Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 918 (2004) (same); Peter 
W. Tague, An Indigent’s Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73, 80, 
89–95 (1974) (same). 
 49. See, e.g., Holly, supra note 10, at 225 (advocating a presumption in favor of 
accommodating an indigent defendant’s choice from among a panel of attorneys 
rendering public defender assistance, and that courts should consider efficiency, reasons 
for the defendant’s choice, and availability of counsel); Lefstein, supra note 48, at 918 
(arguing in favor of preferring an indigent defendant’s choice, as is done in England); 
Tague, supra note 48, at 99 (“The importance to the indigent of choosing his attorney is 




Putting that debate aside for the moment, there is a narrower Sixth 
Amendment right contained within the right to counsel of choice that is 
at issue whenever a trial court severs an ongoing attorney-client relationship.  
Much less debatable, it would seem, is whether the justice system can 
and should give preference to such an ongoing relationship.  When 
Joseph Slappy’s case made its way to the Supreme Court, he was not 
asking for a blanket right to counsel of choice, but was simply asking to 
continue his trial with his appointed lawyer.50  Like Clarence Gideon and 
Anthony Faretta before him, Joseph Slappy hoped that the Court would 
champion the rights and dignity of the indigent criminal defendant.  He 
was terribly wrong. 
Joseph Slappy was charged in San Francisco Superior Court with rape, 
forcible oral copulation, robbery, burglary, and false imprisonment.51  
The prosecution contended that Slappy accosted the female victim in a 
grocery store, was kicked out of the store by the manager, threw a beer 
bottle at the victim when she left the store, and was waiting for her in the 
lobby of her apartment building when she arrived.  Slappy then forced 
her into the basement where he raped and sodomized her, and then 
robbed her.  The victim gave the police a description and the police 
apprehended Slappy two blocks away, wearing the “Afro” wig and the 
green fatigue jacket with a fur-trimmed hood that the victim had 
described.  The police found the victim’s jewelry on Slappy’s person and 
a button from his jacket on the basement floor of the apartment building, 
along with the victim’s scattered clothing.52  Suffice it to say, this was a 
serious, and ugly, case. 
Because Joseph Slappy was indigent, the court appointed the San 
Francisco Public Defender’s office to represent him.53  Deputy Public 
Defender Harvey Goldfine was assigned to the case.  It is unclear when 
the assignment occurred, but the offense date was July 7, 1976, and 
Slappy was arrested the same day.  Goldfine represented Slappy at least 
as early as the preliminary hearing and then supervised “an extensive 
clear: improvement in the attorney-client relationship, representation by an able attorney 
who will fight aggressively for him, and the likelihood of greater participation in 
structuring his defense.”); Kenneth P. Troccoli, “I Want a Black Lawyer to Represent 
Me”: Addressing a Black Defendant’s Concerns with Being Assigned a White Court-
Appointed Lawyer, 20 LAW & INEQ. 1, 48 (2002) (arguing that an indigent defendant 
should be given the option to select his own lawyer and the court should appoint the 
lawyer provided he or she is available, willing, and conflict-free). 
 50. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 6–9 (1983). 
 51. Id. at 5 n.1. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 5. 
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investigation.”54  The trial was scheduled for September 23, 1976, but 
Goldfine was hospitalized for emergency surgery shortly before trial.55
Six days before the trial date, the Public Defender’s office reassigned 
the case to Bruce Hotchkiss, a senior trial attorney in the office.56  In 
those six days, Hotchkiss met with Slappy once at his jail cell to tell him 
he would be representing him, and then one more time before trial.57  On 
the day of trial, Slappy said to the trial court, “I have only had this P.D. 
[Public Defender] for a day and a half, we have not had time to prepare 
this case.”58  Hotchkiss, on the other hand, stated, “I feel that I am prepared.  
My own feeling is that a further continuance would not benefit me in 
presenting the case.”59  Slappy said that he was “satisfied with the Public 
Defender, but it’s just no way, no possible way, that he has had enough 
time to prepare this case.”60  The court construed this as a motion to continue 
and denied it, accentuating that Hotchkiss had had the case for six 
days.61
On the second day of trial, Slappy repeated his concerns that 
Hotchkiss had not had time to prepare the case and said, “Mr. Harvey 
Goldfine was my attorney, he was my attorney, and he still is . . . .  Mr. 
Harvey Goldfine didn’t even have enough time to go over my case with 
me . . . .”62  On the third day of trial, Slappy filed a pro se petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus, claiming he was unrepresented by counsel.63  He 
argued that “my attorney’s in the hospital, and I don’t legally have no 
attorney, and this P.D. here told me . . . I didn’t have no defense to my 
charges.”64  Hotchkiss denied this latter statement, and the trial court 
treated Slappy’s petition as a renewal of the motion to continue and 
denied it.65  Thereafter, Slappy sat through his trial but did not 
 54. Id. at 5. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 461 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 58. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 6.  From Slappy’s point of view, it is a day and a half 
because his first real interview with Hotchkiss was just on the Tuesday before the trial 
began on Thursday.  Id. 
 59. Id.  Mr. Hotchkiss’s choice to go to trial against his client’s wishes and without 
spending the time necessary to establish a relationship with Slappy are inexcusable and 
potentially unethical.  See discussion infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. 
 60. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 6. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 7–8. 
 63. Id. at 8. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 




participate or testify.66  At one point, the following colloquy between the 
judge and Slappy occurred: 
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I’m leaving that part up to you.  I 
asked you may I be excused.  If you don’t want to excuse me, I’ll sit 
right here.  What difference does it make? 
THE COURT: Well, I would urge you then Mr. Slappy to remain 
seated and in the Courtroom, and should you desire to discuss this 
case further with your Counsel, why you certainly can let me know, 
or through your Counsel let me know. 
THE DEFENDANT: What do I have to say to get through to you, 
your Honor, what do I have to say to make you understand.  I have 
told you two or three times and then you keep telling me about 
talking to my Counsel.  I don’t have no attorney . . . .  [M]y 
attorney’s name is Mr. P.D. Goldfine, Harvey Goldfine, that’s my 
attorney, he’s in the hospital. 
THE COURT: Well, I am going to ask you then under the 
circumstances, Mr. Slappy, to remain in the Courtroom and to listen 
to the proceedings and listen to the progress of this case. 
THE DEFENDANT: [T]hat’s up to you what you do, your Honor.  
If you say so I’ll remain here, but I am not participating in the trial, 
I’m through with it, as of now I am through with this trial.  I was 
through with it the 24th when this P.D. told me that I didn’t have no 
defense from my charges.  I was through then, and that’s why I 
didn’t see him when he come down to see me.67
Slappy was convicted of robbery, burglary, and false imprisonment, but 
the jury hung on rape and forcible oral copulation.68
The second trial on the two sexual assault charges took place a week 
later.  Slappy refused to cooperate or even speak with Hotchkiss.  Again, 
he refused to take the stand, against Hotchkiss’s advice.  He was 
convicted of both sexual assault charges this time.69
Slappy’s pro se writ of habeas corpus wound its way to the United 
States Supreme Court.70  Whereas Clarence Gideon is haled as a hero for 
fighting for the right to counsel all the way to the Supreme Court, Joseph 
Slappy’s efforts toward recognition for his plight were treated by Chief 
 66. Id. at 8–9. 
 67. Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 461 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 68. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 9. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at 9–11. 
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Justice Burger with disdain, if not contempt.71  The majority of the Court 
had no sympathy for a man in his position, even as he was without 
funds, accused of a heinous crime, and without the “guiding hand” of a 
lawyer he trusted.72  Chief Justice Burger described Slappy’s “What do I 
have to say to get through to you” comment to the trial judge as a 
renewed “attack” on the judge.73  A more sympathetic observer would 
have described Slappy’s words as courageous and admirable attempts by 
a pro se litigant to maintain his position and his dignity amidst the utter 
abandonment of his concerns by Bruce Hotchkiss and the trial judge. 
The Court’s attitude toward the efforts of Joseph Slappy is notably the 
opposite of the Court’s attitude toward Anthony Faretta eight years 
earlier.74  Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft and requested 
that he be allowed to represent himself.75  The Court was all too willing 
to give Anthony Faretta every benefit of the doubt in granting his 
wishes, emphasizing that “[t]he right to defend is given directly to the 
accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.”76  
Further, “[a]n unwanted counsel ‘represents’ the defendant only through 
a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction.  Unless the accused has 
acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the 
defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is 
not his defense.”77  Alas, while those noble phrases are equally applicable to 
Joseph Slappy, they only apply to a man willing “to make a fool of 
himself,” for “one who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client.”78  Ironically, 
 71. See infra notes 73 and 82 and accompanying text; see also Slappy, 461 U.S. at 
12 (describing Slappy’s refusal to cooperate with Hotchkiss as “adamant–even 
contumacious”); Berger, supra note 6, at 49 (“[F]ive justices . . . had managed to denigrate 
both defense attorney and client, and to do so in a wholly gratuitous fashion.”). 
 72. See Berger, supra note 6, at 50 (finding that, in Slappy, the Court “reached out 
to disparage generally the importance of the bond between an accused and his attorney.  
Their doing so, moreover, in the setting of a poor man’s prosecution revealed a total 
insensitivity to the special disadvantages of pauper defendants caught in the toils of 
assembly-line justice.”). 
 73. It is worth noting that Burger excerpted only that one comment from Slappy 
from the fuller colloquy quoted by the Ninth Circuit and recited in this Article.  Of 
course, out of context, that statement may appear ruder and more abrupt to the reader. 
 74. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
 75. Id. at 807. 
 76. Id. at 819–20. 
 77. Id. at 821. 
 78. Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 




then, Joseph Slappy only could have won the Court’s approval if he was 
foolish enough to represent himself.79
Further, Slappy, who was essentially pro se in his presentation to the 
court, was expected to make his arguments with precision.  Because 
Slappy framed his complaints as Hotchkiss not being ready, and did not 
express dissatisfaction with Hotchkiss himself until “midtrial,”80 all nine 
members of the Court agreed that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying a continuance.81  Further, while there was no evidence in the 
record of any dishonesty,82 Chief Justice Burger surmised that the trial 
court “could reasonably have concluded that respondent’s belated 
requests to be represented by Goldfine were not made in good faith but 
were a transparent ploy for a delay.”83
 79. Professor Garcia notes that “the dignitary values Faretta safeguarded were 
scorned in Slappy,” Garcia, supra note 18, at 96, and further: 
Since rendering its opinion in Faretta . . . the Court has been loath to recognize 
the crucial dignitary norms promoted by the right to counsel.  Rather, the Court 
has devalued the critical link between the defendant’s dignity and the 
attorney’s role in preserving and safeguarding the client’s autonomy against 
the government. 
Id. at 92.  Professor Tague also emphasizes: 
It is ironic that judges so jealously guard the power to select an indigent’s 
attorney while granting so much freedom to other aspects of the relationship 
between a criminal defendant and his attorney.  Traditionally the courts have 
found that a defendant has an interest in defending himself in whatever way he 
considers best, using whatever resources are legitimately available to him, 
regardless of the consequences. 
Tague, supra note 48, at 84–85. 
 80. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13 (1983). 
 81. See id. at 12; id. at 18 (Brennan, J., concurring); id.at 29 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
 82. The Ninth Circuit had noted that there was no evidence in the record of bad 
faith on the part of Joseph Slappy in making his request.  Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 
718, 722 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 461 U.S. 1 (1983).  Chief Justice Burger cites to no 
evidence, but simply recites the State’s contention that it was bad faith.  Slappy, 461 U.S. 
at 11 n.4. 
 83. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 13.  Inexplicably, Chief Justice Burger continued, “In our 
view, the record shows that the trial judge exhibited sensitive concern for the rights of 
the accused and extraordinary patience with a contumacious litigant.”  Id.  Rather, the 
record showed a trial court allowing substitute counsel to step in on a very serious felony 
case only six days before trial and over the defendant’s firm and unwavering objection.  
Id. at 5–9. 
  Consistent with Burger’s negative view of Slappy is the finding that “judges in 
the criminal justice system appear to rely on their own, often skeptical, presumptions 
regarding a criminal defendant’s or his lawyer’s motivations for alleging a breakdown in 
the lawyer-client relationship” when ruling on motions to substitute counsel.  Lindsay R. 
Goldstein, Note, A View from the Bench: Why Judges Fail to Protect Trust and 
Confidence in the Lawyer-Client Relationship—An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2665, 2700 (2005).  Goldstein’s review of the judiciary’s response 
to motions to withdraw or substitute counsel in civil and criminal cases suggests: 
[D]espite some congruence in judges’ approaches to breakdowns in the 
lawyer-client relationship, judges in the criminal context seem more likely to 
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Before Joseph Slappy’s writ reached the Supreme Court, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals had decided that his writ should be granted if 
he was not given a new trial on all five counts.84  The Court of Appeals 
found that, while “an indigent defendant does not have an unqualified 
right to the appointment of counsel of his own choosing,” he does have a 
Sixth Amendment right to “a meaningful attorney-client relationship.”85  
The trial court ignored this right by failing to conduct a balancing test 
weighing Slappy’s interest in continued representation by Goldfine 
against the State’s interest in proceeding with the scheduled trial.86  
Indeed, the trial court had not inquired at all into the expected length of 
Goldfine’s unavailability.  Hence, the appellate court said the violation 
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel required automatic reversal, 
without a showing of prejudice.87
Chief Justice Burger, writing for five members of the Court,  scoffed 
at the notion that the Sixth Amendment contains a right to a meaningful 
attorney-client relationship.88  He dismissed the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in 
one short paragraph, stating simply that it is “without basis in the law.”89  
Because the indigent defendant has no right to counsel of choice, the 
reject even a worthy motion to withdraw or substitute counsel.  The apparent 
result of this disparate treatment is that trust and confidence in the lawyer-
client relationship receives less protection in the criminal justice system than in 
civil litigation. 
Id. at 2681–82. 
 84. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 11. 
 85. Slappy, 649 F.2d at 720. 
 86. The Ninth Circuit stated: 
Because of the importance of the attorney-client relationship to the substance 
of the defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel, we hold that the sixth 
amendment (as incorporated by the fourteenth amendment) encompasses the 
right to have the trial judge accord weight to that relationship in determining 
whether to grant a continuance founded on the temporary unavailability of a 
defendant’s particular attorney.  In considering the continuance, the trial court 
must balance the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel against the societal 
interest in the “prompt and efficient administration of justice.” 
Id. at 721 (quoting Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
 87. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 11. 
 88. Although the Court was unanimous in the judgment, all agreeing that the 
denial of the defendant’s motion for a continuance was well within the court’s discretion, 
Justice Brennan’s concurrence, joined by Justice Marshall, disagreed with the Court’s 
conclusion denying a right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship.  Id. at 15 
(Brennan, J., concurring).  Justices Blackmun and Stevens wrote separately to argue that 
the Court should not have addressed the Sixth Amendment issue.  Id. at 29 (Blackmun, 
J., concurring). 
 89. Id. at 13 (majority opinion). 




Court treated the issue as simply a matter of a judge’s broad discretion to 
grant or deny a continuance.90  Of course, this discretion was not abused 
because substitute counsel Hotchkiss said he was ready for trial.91
While not directly deciding the issue, a majority of the Supreme Court 
did not appear sympathetic to recognizing a right to continue an ongoing 
attorney-client relationship.  As argued by Professor Alfredo Garcia, “The 
cumulative impact of Slappy, Wheat, and Caplin is to abridge the 
defendant’s dignitary interest in counsel who will be perceived as 
effective and who will foster the defendant’s belief in the legitimacy of 
the criminal process.”92
IV.  THE RIGHT TO A MEANINGFUL ATTORNEY-CLIENT  
RELATIONSHIP 
The concept of a Sixth Amendment “right to a meaningful attorney-
client relationship” was obviously too vague for the Supreme Court to 
embrace in Slappy.93  However, like all of the rights enumerated in the 
Sixth Amendment, the right simply needs defining parameters.  One 
concrete aspect of the right that can be easily embraced and defined is a 
Sixth Amendment right to continue an ongoing relationship with 
counsel, whether appointed or retained.94  The right to retained counsel 
of choice is supported by three basic tenets of our adversary system: 
trust, autonomy, and fairness.  Those three precepts apply equally to 
recognition of a Sixth Amendment right of any defendant to continue a 
relationship with counsel without undue interference from the trial court. 
First, the development of trust between the attorney and her client is 
well recognized by the courts and ethical rules as “the cornerstone of the 
adversary system”95 and a primary rationale behind the right to counsel 
 90. Id. at 11–12. 
 91. Id. at 12. 
 92. Garcia, supra note 18, at 98. 
 93. See Slappy, 461 U.S. at 13–14. 
 94. Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring in Slappy, agreed with the Ninth 
Circuit that, while an indigent defendant has no right to choose his appointed counsel, he 
does have a right to continued representation by the attorney appointed to represent him 
and with whom he has developed a relationship.  Slappy, 461 U.S. at 20–21 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
 95. Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1981) (“Basic trust between 
counsel and defendant is the cornerstone of the adversary system and effective assistance 
of counsel.”).  See also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.1(a) (1993) (“Defense counsel should seek 
to establish a relationship of trust and confidence with the accused . . . .”); MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2007) (stating that trust is “the hallmark of the client-
lawyer relationship”). 
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of choice.96  If the client trusts his lawyer, the quality of representation is 
vastly increased.  An effective defense at trial, the negotiation of a good 
plea bargain, and the development of mitigating evidence for sentencing 
all require the full cooperation of the client.97  A trusting client is far 
more likely to reveal facts and details that not only help in formulating 
the defense, but, in the absence of broad discovery rules, help the 
attorney learn more about the prosecution’s case.98  The ethical rules 
 96. See, e.g., United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 816 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(“The denial of a defendant’s right to choose his own counsel jeopardizes his sixth 
amendment guarantees because ‘a substantial risk [arises] that the basic trust between 
counsel and client, which is a cornerstone of the adversary system, would be undercut.’”) 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 97. Professor Anne Bowen Poulin notes that:  
Counsel’s view of the defendant, as well as the defendant’s trust or mistrust of 
counsel, plays a role in determining the course of the defendant’s representation.  
Thus, the relationship between the defendant and counsel plays a critical role 
in ensuring the defendant’s proper involvement in the proceedings and will be 
enhanced if based on the defendant’s desire to begin or maintain that 
relationship. 
Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Counsel, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1250–51 (2006). 
 98. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 20–21 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“Counsel is provided to assist the defendant in presenting his defense, but in order to do 
so effectively the attorney must work closely with the defendant in formulating defense 
strategy.  This may require the defendant to disclose embarrassing and intimate 
information to his attorney.”).  The Ninth Circuit expressed a similar view in Slappy v. 
Morris, noting that: 
The attorney-client relationship involves ‘an intimate process of consultation 
and planning which culminates in a state of trust and confidence between the 
client and his attorney.’  Often, the outcome of a criminal trial may hinge upon 
the extent to which the defendant is able to communicate to his attorney the 
most intimate and embarrassing details of his personal life.  Complete candor 
in attorney-client consultations may disclose defenses or mitigating circumstances 
that defense counsel would not otherwise have uncovered.  At the very least, 
an open exchange between attorney and client will often foreclose the possibility of 
surprise at trial. 
649 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (citation omitted).  The ABA 
Standards emphasize the importance of trust, stating: 
Nothing is more fundamental to the lawyer-client relationship than the 
establishment of trust and confidence.  Without it, the client may withhold 
essential information from the lawyer.  Thus, important evidence may not be 
obtained, valuable defenses neglected, and, perhaps most significant, defense 
counsel may not be forewarned of evidence that may be presented by the 
prosecution. 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION 
Standard 4-3.1 cmt. (1993). 




guiding criminal defense attorneys expect and require the development 
of this trusting relationship.99
Trust also means that the defendant is far more likely to follow his 
lawyer’s advice and instincts.100  Representing a criminal defendant is a 
treacherous balancing act.  A good lawyer is sometimes tough with the 
prosecution, and sometimes cooperative with the prosecution, depending 
upon what is best for the client.  A good lawyer tries to persuade his 
client to plead guilty when, in his or her professional opinion, a plea will 
produce a better outcome.  A good lawyer persuades his client not to 
testify when it will reveal damaging prior convictions.  If the client does 
not trust his lawyer, the client’s instincts will tell him to fight the lawyer 
at every step.  Representation, and likely the outcome, will suffer.  There 
is no way to know whether Harvey Goldfine would have been able to 
produce a better result for Joseph Slappy, but with his client’s cooperation, 
Goldfine would have had a much better chance than Hotchkiss. 
A defendant who is able to choose and hire his lawyer is far more 
likely to trust that attorney than a defendant who cannot afford a lawyer 
and has one appointed by the court.101  There is good reason for this 
 99. The ABA Standards, standards to which the Court has “long . . . referred ‘as 
guides to determining what is reasonable’” in determining competency of representation, 
set out duties of counsel which would be all but impossible without a trusting 
relationship with the client.  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).  For example, because “[t]he client 
is usually the lawyer’s primary source of information for an effective defense,” counsel 
is charged with seeking to know “all relevant facts known to the accused” as soon as 
practicable.  ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEFENSE 
FUNCTION Standard 4-3.2(a) & cmt. (1993).  Counsel must keep the client informed of 
developments and progress, id. Standard 4-3.8(a), give explanations to the extent 
necessary to help the client make informed decisions, id. Standard 4-3.8(b), urge the 
client to take professional advice, id. Standard 4-5.2(a) & cmt., involve the client in plea 
discussions, id. Standard 4-5.2(a), and develop and raise mitigating factors both to the 
prosecutor initially and to the court at sentencing, id. Standard 4-4.1 cmt.  The ABA 
Standards admit that confidence of the client in his lawyer is critical and that chosen 
counsel’s persuasion will carry greater weight.  Id. Standard 4-1.2 cmt. 
 100. The Ninth Circuit elaborated: 
The attorney-client relationship is accorded special protection because of its 
impact on the truth-finding process . . . .  But representation at trial is without 
substance if the defendant does not have confidence in his attorney’s ability to 
represent the defendant’s best interests.  It is unlikely that a criminal defendant 
will have a legal education.  He, therefore, will have to rely on his attorney’s 
advice for the most basic decisions in a criminal trial whether to plead guilty, 
whether to testify, whether to present a defense, and which witnesses to call.  If 
the defendant does not trust his attorney, he may be unwilling to follow his 
attorney’s advice in these most important areas. 
Slappy, 649 F.2d at 720. 
 101. Studies have shown this to be the case.  See Marcus T. Boccaccini & Stanley 
L. Brodsky, Characteristics of the Ideal Criminal Defense Attorney from the Client’s 
Perspective: Empirical Findings and Implications for Legal Practice, 25 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 87 (2001) (finding that the studies show that retained attorneys are 
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since the quality of representation for poor criminal defendants in this 
country suffers greatly.  Many public defenders do not have the time, resources, 
or abilities to meet with their clients often, keep them informed, or 
develop trust.102  They are underpaid and overworked, and, sadly, many 
also do not care.103  Therefore, when an indigent defendant does develop 
a working relationship with an appointed attorney, and wishes to keep 
that attorney, it should not be easily severed.104
Second, the decision to choose one’s lawyer, or, in this case, to choose 
to continue an ongoing relationship without risk of it being severed, 
promotes individual autonomy.105  The Supreme Court has recognized 
this as a core value in Faretta, for it is the defendant whose freedom is at 
stake, and he should have a role in key decisions related to the course 
and quality of his defense.106  Courts recognize that autonomy is served 
viewed more positively than court-appointed attorneys, who are generally not trusted and 
are perceived as representing the state and as inexperienced and overworked). 
 102. See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449 (2005). 
  For indigent defendants the development of robust communicative 
relationships with counsel is difficult if not impossible.  In overburdened state 
courts, it is not uncommon for a defendant to meet his public defender, hear 
about the deal, and decide what to do—all in the span of less than an hour and 
within the confines of a court lock-up or hallway while waiting to go into 
court. 
Id. at 1462. 
 103. See Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 253–
54 (“Defendants are not only given bad lawyers, they are tethered to them because 
defendants have no right to replace even the most incompetent and unsympathetic 
lawyer.”). 
 104. See Berger, supra note 6, at 50 (“[T]he grim reality of indigents’ pervasive 
mistrust of their lawyers . . . should make a court hesitate to compel or condone the 
rupture of a good indigent-counsel relationship.”). 
 105. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984) (stating that the right 
of an accused to retain counsel of his choice “reflects constitutional protection of the 
defendant’s free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the 
proceeding”); Holly, supra note 10, at 188 (stating that the right to counsel of choice 
implicates accused’s personal interest in autonomy and the personal right to control 
one’s defense). 
 106. The Second Circuit recognized that: 
[T]he defendants’ choice is to be honored out of respect for them as free and 
rational beings, responsible for their own fates. . . .  The resolve of the 
[defendants] to stand before the law together, . . . no less than Faretta’s resolve 
to stand before the law entirely alone, is worthy of constitutional protection. 
United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 25 (2d Cir. 1982) (Friendly, J.).  See Morris v. 
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Given the importance of 
counsel to the presentation of an effective defense, it should be obvious that a defendant 




by the nonindigent defendant’s right to counsel of choice.107  Logically, 
it is served by any measure of choice given to the indigent defendant.  
Because lawyers are not interchangeable, choosing a lawyer can make 
all of the difference in the way a case proceeds.108  A client who consciously 
chooses or prefers an aggressive litigator may be more likely go to trial 
than a client who prefers a lawyer whom he knows gets great deals from 
the prosecutor.  Regardless of what the defendant knows in advance, 
each lawyer will choose her own strategies at every step, as there are 
usually multiple possible strategies.  Choosing his lawyer may be the 
most important choice the defendant will make in the presentation of his 
defense.109
Lastly, the right to an ongoing relationship with a lawyer of one’s 
choosing promotes the principles of fairness and integrity in the criminal 
judicial process.  For example, the defendant is more likely to see the 
has an interest in his relationship with his attorney. . . .  It is the defendant’s interests, 
and freedom, which are at stake.”). 
 107. In dissent in Wheat v. United States, Justice Marshall observed that the right to 
counsel of choice sounded in “an appreciation that a primary purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment is to grant a criminal defendant effective control over the conduct of his 
defense” and “[a]n obviously critical aspect of making a defense [acknowledged in 
Faretta] is choosing a person to serve as an assistant and representative.”  486 U.S. 153, 
165–66 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 108. Third Circuit Judge Higginbotham described the importance of selecting an 
attorney as follows: 
We would reject reality if we were to suggest that lawyers are a homogenous 
group.  Attorneys are not fungible, as are eggs, apples and oranges.  Attorneys 
may differ as to their trial strategy, their oratory style, or the importance they 
give to particular legal issues.  The differences, all within the range of effective 
and competent advocacy, may be important in the development of the defense.  
Given this reality, a defendant’s decision to select a particular attorney 
becomes critical to the type of defense he will make and thus falls within the 
ambit of the sixth amendment. 
United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979).  See also Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 
F.2d 604, 610 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989) (“The most important 
decision a defendant makes in shaping his defense is his selection of an attorney.  The 
selected attorney is the mechanism through which the defendant will learn of the options 
which are available to him.”); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1502 (10th Cir. 
1988) (“A defendant’s right to choose an attorney is a corollary right to decide what type 
of defense the accused will present.”); Curcio, 694 F.2d at 24 (recognizing that 
defendants who sought joint representation by a single chosen attorney through whom 
they had been previously represented were asserting their “right to present their defense 
in what they have reasonably concluded to be the most effective fashion . . . .”). 
 109. As some commentators noted: 
Choice of counsel in some cases may be the most important decision the 
defendant makes. . . .  Because the defendant has to live with the results of 
such decisions by counsel, it may be argued that the defendant should be given 
an unfettered right to choose counsel on the basis of a right to personal 
autonomy . . . . 
Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Client Autonomy and Choice of Counsel, CRIM. 
JUST., Fall 2006, at 57, 59. 
HOEFFEL 11/16/2007  9:24:49 AM 
[VOL. 44:  525, 2007]  A More Robust Right to Counsel of Choice 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 545 
 
process as fair if the judge’s calendar does not prevail over his relationship 
with his lawyer.110  Also, allowing the indigent defendant the very limited 
tool of choosing to continue with counsel he trusts provides some 
equilibrium with the government, which traditionally possesses more 
power, more money, and more tools.111
Of course, since the majority of the Court in Slappy appeared to reject 
many of these same arguments, as made by the Ninth Circuit and by 
concurring Justices Brennan and Marshall, it may seem that the cause is 
lost.  However, the Court did not rule directly on the issue and merely 
rejected in dicta a broader right to “a meaningful attorney-client 
relationship.”112  Furthermore, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,  a 
different set of Supreme Court Justices put a new spin on the right to 
counsel of choice that offers room for a reconsideration of the limited 
goal of Joseph Slappy.113
V.  REVISITING SLAPPY AFTER GONZALEZ-LOPEZ 
On June 26, 2006, the Court decided Gonzalez-Lopez, and the case 
made very few ripples in the academic community.  Gonzalez-Lopez 
would appear to affect only the ten percent of criminal defendants who 
retain counsel,  and only the small percent of those whose choice of 
counsel is erroneously denied.114  However, in penning the opinion for 
the Court, Justice Scalia made several declarations about the right to 
counsel of choice that may well have a much larger ripple effect. 
Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez was charged in federal court with 
 110. Professor Poulin notes that “[c]hanging counsel without the defendant’s 
consent reduces the likelihood that the defendant will receive effective assistance, and 
will perceive the process as fair.”  Poulin, supra note 97, at 1256.  This point is underscored 
by Professor Garcia: 
To a large degree, the defendant’s willingness and ability to acquiesce in the 
outcome of the criminal process hinges on his confidence in the efficiency of 
trial counsel.  Because the Court [in Slappy] refused to acknowledge at least a 
“qualified” right of an indigent defendant to continue an existing relationship 
with appointed counsel, it further undermined, if not obliterated, any belief in 
the legitimacy of the system the accused may have had. 
Garcia, supra note 18, at 96–97. 
 111. See Garcia, supra note 18, at 86 (“This right to retain private counsel is crucial 
to the validity of the adversary process because it ensures somewhat of an equilibrium 
between the prosecution and the defense.”). 
 112. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 13–14. 
 113. 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006). 
 114. See Joy & McMunigal, supra note 109, at 57 (providing that public defenders 
and other appointed counsel represent approximately ninety percent of criminal defendants). 




conspiracy to deliver more than one hundred kilograms of marijuana.115  
Gonzalez-Lopez wanted out-of-state attorney Joseph Low to represent 
him.  Joseph Low was an award-winning, seasoned defense attorney 
known for his aggressive approach to criminal defense work.116  Low 
filed a motion for admission pro hac vice, and he affiliated with local 
counsel Karl Dickhaus for the limited purpose of handling filings.  Dickhaus 
was a consumer protection attorney with little criminal experience.  The 
federal district court erroneously denied Low’s several motions for 
admission pro hac vice.117  The case proceeded to trial with Dickhaus as 
sole counsel.  The court denied Dickhaus’s request to have Low sit at 
counsel table with him and ordered Low to sit in the audience and have 
no contact with local counsel.  The court went so far as to place a United 
States Marshal between Low and Dickhaus.118
On appeal, the Government conceded that the defendant was erroneously 
denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice.119  The only 
questions for the Court were whether the defendant had to show 
prejudice from the erroneous denial, as is required under the Strickland 
v. Washington analysis,120 and whether the error was subject to harmlessness 
review or was in fact structural error amounting to automatic reversal.121  
A bare majority of the Court held that prejudice need not be shown and 
that the error was structural.122
Justice Scalia’s analysis123 made a major doctrinal shift in the Court’s 
jurisprudence on the right to counsel of choice.  The Court in Wheat had 
said that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not guarantee choice, 
but only that a trial be fair.124  In other words, the denial of counsel of 
first choice would not be violated as long as replacement counsel was 
“effective” under Strickland v. Washington’s minimal standards.  Justice 
Scalia switched this course: “It is true enough that the purpose of the 
rights set forth in that Amendment is to ensure a fair trial; but it does not 
follow that the rights can be disregarded so long as the trial is, on the 
whole, fair.”125  Instead, Justice Scalia gave the right to counsel of choice 
 115. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2560. 
 116. Brief for the Respondent at 2, Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (No. 05-352), 
2006 WL 838892. 
 117. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2560–61. 
 118. Id. at 2560. 
 119. Id. at 2561. 
 120. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 121. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2560. 
 122. As already noted, this holding was not necessarily unexpected.  See supra note 
10. 
 123. Justice Scalia was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  
Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2557. 
 124. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). 
 125. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2562. 
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its own separate place of distinction within the Sixth Amendment, much as 
he did with the Confrontation Clause:126 “The right to select counsel of 
one’s choice . . . has never been derived from the Sixth Amendment’s 
purpose of ensuring a fair trial.  It has been regarded as the root meaning 
of the constitutional guarantee.”127  In other words, the Sixth Amendment 
originally referred to the man of means’ right to bring a lawyer of his 
choosing to court with him. 
Justice Scalia went further to explain the consequences of an 
erroneous denial of choice: “[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel of 
choice . . . commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee 
of fairness be provided—to wit, that the accused be defended by the 
counsel he believes to be the best.”128  Therefore, the deprivation of the 
right is complete when the defendant is erroneously denied counsel of 
his first choice, regardless of the effectiveness of the representation he 
actually received.129  In Justice Scalia’s words, “To argue otherwise is to 
confuse the right to counsel of choice—which is the right to a particular 
lawyer regardless of comparative effectiveness—with the right to effective 
 126. Indeed, Justice Scalia did not miss the opportunity to compare his analysis of 
the right to counsel of choice with the right to confrontation.  Id. (citing Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)). 
 127. Id. at 2563 (citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159; Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24 
(1898); WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 18–24, 27–33 
(1955)).  For a criticism of this point by Justice Scalia, see Paul Alessio Mezzina, 
Elevating Choice Over Quality of Representation: United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 
S. Ct. 2557 (2006), 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 451, 454 (2006) (“[T]he supposed right 
to counsel of choice was born out of the reality that private retention of counsel was the 
only way for many defendants to obtain meaningful legal assistance.”).  See also id. at 
456 (“[T]he text, structure, and history of the Amendment suggest a right to obtain a 
certain fixed quantum of legal representation by private retention.”). 
 128. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2562. 
 129. The reason that Justice Scalia finds that prejudice need not be shown reflects 
the importance of the defendant’s autonomous choice: 
Different attorneys will pursue different strategies with regard to investigation 
and discovery, development of the theory of defense, selection of the jury, 
presentation of the witnesses, and style of witness examination and jury 
argument.  And the choice of attorney will affect whether and on what terms 
the defendant cooperates with the prosecution, plea bargains, or decides 
instead to go to trial.  In light of these myriad aspects of representation, the 
erroneous denial of counsel bears directly on the “framework within which the 
trial proceeds,” or indeed on whether it proceeds at all.  It is impossible to 
know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then 
to quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the 
proceedings. 
Id. at 2564 (citation omitted). 




counsel—which imposes a baseline requirement of competence on whatever 
lawyer is chosen or appointed.”130
As expansive as his language is, Justice Scalia noted for the record 
that the right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who 
require counsel to be appointed for them.131  He referred to Slappy as 
representing a “trial court’s wide latitude in balancing the right to 
counsel of choice . . . against the demands of its calendar.”132  Of course, 
as the Ninth Circuit and Justice Brennan noted in Slappy, the trial court 
in Slappy never balanced any “right” against its calendar, having 
recognized no right and not having made an inquiry into the amount of 
time Goldfine would be unavailable.133
Nonetheless, once again, the Court was not presented with the 
question of whether there is a Sixth Amendment right to an ongoing 
attorney-client relationship, and so it remains an issue to be decided.  
However, by enshrining the right to counsel of choice in its own place 
among Sixth Amendment rights and disaggregating it from the right to 
mere effective assistance of counsel, Justice Scalia gives the issue new 
life.  If the core of the right is choice, and not effectiveness, and if it is so 
fundamental that it leads to automatic reversal when ignored, then the 
right is more robust than previously acknowledged. 
First, for nonindigent defendants, lower courts must recognize that 
increased weight must be given to the right to counsel of choice when 
balancing it against governmental interests.  While the government 
surely has powerful interests in ethical and just proceedings such that, 
for example, a defendant should not be represented by a person who is 
not a lawyer or by an attorney with an active conflict,134 the court’s 
interest in expeditious proceedings is quite different.  The courts should 
grant a request for a continuance to accommodate chosen counsel’s 
schedule or illness, unless to do so would create a manifest injustice.  
Manifest injustice would not include a reasonable delay of trial, nor 
would it include a delay of justice for the victim or the victim’s family.  
While the victim’s interests are an important governmental concern, they 
cannot outweigh the defendant’s fundamental constitutional right to be 
represented by the attorney he chose to represent him.135
 130. Id. at 2563. 
 131. Id. at 2565. 
 132. Id. at 2565–66. 
 133. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring); 
Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 721–22 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 134. The word “active” is meant to distinguish it from the kind of distant potential 
conflict at issue in Wheat.  See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 155 (1988). 
 135. In Morris v. Slappy, Chief Justice Burger criticized the Ninth Circuit for 
creating the “novel idea” of a Sixth Amendment right to a meaningful attorney-client 
relationship and ignoring the victim’s rights; he argued that allowing for an automatic 
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Second, if the right to counsel of choice is fundamental to the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, it should be extended to indigent defendants, 
at least with respect to a right to choose to continue an ongoing attorney-
client relationship.  This should not only include the continuation of a 
relationship within a trial, but between trials.  In other words, given the 
importance of trust, autonomy, and fairness to the right to counsel of 
choice, the court should appoint the same attorney to represent an indigent 
defendant in his subsequent cases, if the defendant so chooses.136  The 
continuity of the relationship would enhance perceptions of fairness, 
decrease start-up costs, and ensure the best possible representation from 
the client’s perspective.137
Again, here, the court should not be able to sever the relationship over 
the defendant’s objection in the absence of manifest injustice, and particularly 
not for purposes of expeditious calendaring.  In Slappy, Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence was a bit too vague when it acknowledged that a right to 
continued representation may be qualified by a balancing inquiry between 
the defendant’s interest and “the public’s interest in the efficient and 
expeditious administration of criminal justice.”138  Certainly, if Goldfine 
was going to be unavailable for a year, then Joseph Slappy’s preference 
could not be accommodated.  However, the primacy of the constitutional 
interest in the continued relationship would outweigh any reasonable 
delay. 
Joseph Slappy had the right instincts.  He believed that the law contrived 
against him, as he was rushed to trial with a lawyer he had just met.  No 
matter how heinous the crime, an indigent defendant has a constitutional 
right to be assisted in facing those charges.  That assistance is worthless 
reversal in the case would have required the victim to “undergo[] the ordeal of yet a third 
trial in this case.”  461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983).  The first two trials were the result of a hung 
jury on some counts, and, in any case, one of the costs of violating the fundamental 
constitutional rights of a criminal defendant is that victims have to undergo new trials. 
 136. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 403 S.E.2d 800, 801 (Ga. 1991); Amadeo v. State, 
384 S.E.2d 181, 183 (Ga. 1989) (appointing, upon defendant’s request, the attorney who 
had represented defendant in his original capital trial now being retried); Harris v. 
Superior Court, 567 P.2d 750, 758–59 (Cal. 1977) (holding that the trial court abused 
discretion in denying the request of defendant, member of a radical group, for 
appointment of two attorneys who had represented members of the same radical group in 
prior criminal proceedings and had established familiarity and trust). 
 137. See Holly, supra note 10, at 207 (“[A] greater stability and trust between 
counsel and client will cause a proportional decline in the need for pre-trial motions for 
continuances and post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance.”). 
 138. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 25 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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to the defendant if he cannot establish a working relationship with the 
lawyer appointed to represent him—he cannot make his defense.  While 
it may be more than the Supreme Court can bite off to say that the Sixth 
Amendment includes a positive right to a “meaningful attorney-client 
relationship,” it is surely palatable to conclude that the fundamental right 
to counsel of choice includes the right of any criminal defendant to 
continue an ongoing attorney-client relationship.  If the opportunity arises, 
the Court should think hard about what Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez 
has to offer Joseph Slappy. 
 
